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SECURITY INFORMATION

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DEC 11 1951

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

10 December 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Colonel B. B. Talley, G-2  
Captain Ray Malpass, ONI  
Colonel Edward H. Porter, AFOIN  
Colonel S. M. Lansing, JIG

SUBJECT : SE-20: The Consequences of Certain US Courses  
of Action with Respect to Communist China and  
Korea

1. The attached estimate is urgently required by the Senior NSC Staff. We are therefore not attempting to coordinate at this time the various supporting TABS which will be included in the final paper.

2. For present purposes we request your cooperation in an attempt to get the attached text before the IAC this week.

3. It is requested that your representative meet with us at 10:30 Wednesday, 12 December, in Room 146 South Building to discuss this paper.

4. The following TABS have been prepared, are currently before the Board, and will be circulated for coordination at a later date:

TAB "A" Analysis of Chinese Communist Trade  
for 1951

TAB "B" Strategic Targets in Communist China

TAB "C" Communist China's Air Defense Capabilities

TAB "D" Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces

DOCUMENT NO.  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐  
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S  
AUTH: HR 10-2

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
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TAB "E" Estimate of the Present Strength and  
Capabilities of Anti-Communist Guerrillas  
in China

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "B"

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SECURITY INFORMATION

53817-c

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 December 1951

SUBJECT: SE-20: THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA (For consideration by IAC Representatives)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain US courses of action, and (b) the Communist reaction to these courses of action.

ESTIMATE

1. Expansion of the War in Korea by Interdiction of Seaborne Imports to Communist China.

a. An effective interdiction of Communist Chinese seaborne imports would require both: (1) an embargo on exports and shipping to Communist China by all important non-Communist trading and maritime countries; and (2) the imposition of a full scale naval blockade of all Chinese Communist ports, including Port Arthur and Dairen. It would be essential to

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The question of whether the UN would support the US in these courses of action is beyond the scope of this paper.

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